Do Human Beings Have Infinite Dignity?

On the First Line of Dignitas Infinita

There has been a lot of pushback to the title and first line of the newest declaration from the DDF (formerly the CDF) entitled Dignitas infinita. That first line reads as such:

“Every human person possesses an infinite dignity, inalienably grounded in his or her very being, which prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter.”

At first, the claim that human beings possess infinite dignity seems not only grossly erroneous but even blasphemous. God alone possesses infinite dignity, and any attempt to assert that men too possess infinite dignity has been taken as a kind of theological Tower of Babel, positing a self-idolatrous equality between creatures and their Creator.

But this outrage, I think, is mistaken, and precisely because it is founded upon a misunderstanding of the document.

Words can and are used relative to a given context. When the same word is used in two different contexts, it is important that we understand if the word is being used precisely in the same way in both contexts, i.e. univocally, or whether it is being used similarly but not precisely in the same way, i.e. analogously.

In particular, many metaphysical and mathematical terms can be used in a context-dependent way. Herbert McCabe O.P. notes that, in the metaphysical category, we have context-dependent words like “good” and “exists.” In the mathematical category, we have words like “half” and “small.” McCabe also provides the example of the word “typical,” which is also a context-dependent word because, “The characteristics in virtue of which something is said to be a typical industrial town are quite different from those in virtue of which something is said to be a typical Siamese cat.”¹ If I were to sigh and mutter “Well isn’t that just typical,” my friend could not even begin to guess as to what characteristics I might be talking about until he knows the context of my use of the word “typical",” or put another way, that to which I am applying the word.

Sometimes the context of a context-dependent word is universal (although in some sense we might say that this usage is “without context”), and in this sense we say that something is true simply. Theologically, we say that God exists simply, because I do not have to add anything more to the sentence to say something intelligible and true. I cannot equally say “Bob exists simply,” because this is untrue. Bob merely possesses existence and that is from another. Thus, as one example of the difference between him and God, he could lose his existence. This means that he cannot be said to exist in the same way that God can be said to exist. As such, it is important to note that the word “exists” is being used in these two cases analogously.

Certainly it is true to say that God has infinite dignity simply. His dignity is infinite, and whether I mean by that phrase that He is infinitely perfect or that He possesses his perfections without limit, I need add nothing more to the sentence in order for it to be correct. Similarly, it is incorrect to say that man has infinite dignity simply, for there are certainly important ways in which this is incorrect. Man is created, limited in his perfections, a kind among other kinds, and therefore cannot be equal to the infinite dignity of God in the way that we are now speaking about infinite dignity.

But might there be other contexts in which it would be correct to say that man does indeed possess infinite dignity? Consider the context of the document. It is, in sum, a critique of certain actions and ideologies that are inconsistent with man’s dignity. These include human trafficking, abortion, surrogacy, gender theory, and so-called sex changes. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that the context in which “infinite dignity” is here being used is the context of particularly human dignity and not dignity more universally. If it were addressing dignity universally, then we should expect it to say that men have less dignity than God. But if it is addressing human dignity rather than dignity simply, we must keep this context in mind while reading.

So what might the document mean in this context? I think the ending of the opening sentence (the very sentence in which men are first said to possess infinite dignity) gives us a strong clue. It says of man’s dignity that it is “inalienably grounded” and that it “prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter.”

Wuellner defines Infinitus/infinita as “unlimited; unbounded; immeasurable; inexhaustible.” This is precisely what the document is saying regarding the mode of possession of the kind of dignity that humans have by nature. That which is discretely measurable is finite; it could be counted up. It could also be the sort of thing that, at least theoretically, one could gain more of (or, conversely, lose some of). But the document’s main concern is to point out that man’s possession of human dignity is not like this.

Men do not gain or lose the ontological dignity of human nature precisely because, no matter what men do or happens to them, they remain human. The dignity of humanity is in the form of humanity itself, such that, so long as someone remains alive as a human being, they have the form of human being in just the same measure as they always have and with just the same degree of accompanying dignity. A human possesses human nature fully or completely. This is not the kind of thing that one can possess only to some degree. This is to say nothing other than that, within the context of particularly human dignity, man possesses that dignity inexhaustibly, that is, infinitely.

This is the principle that the document wishes to lay down at the outset precisely because it is the grounding for condemning the various acts and ideologies outlined above. Every human being possesses a dignity to which, at least in some sense, all of these acts and ideologies are contrary. Since that dignity (that stands as the grounds for condemning these things) can be neither increased nor decreased, there are no situations in which these acts can be called good for human beings.

If this is what the document means, then it is decidedly not saying that human dignity is equal to God’s dignity. Rather, human beings possess a finite dignity infinitely. That humans possess their finite dignity in an infinite way in no way contradicts the notion that their dignity relative to God is indeed finite. And therefore, the document in no way states that man’s dignity is equal to God’s.

It ought to be noted that this dignity pertains only to ontological dignity, that is, the dignity that attaches to the what that man is. Dignitas infinita distinguishes moral dignity from ontological dignity. Moral dignity flows not from what man is but how he acts. And importantly, the document notes that this sort of dignity can indeed be increased and decreased.²

It should also be noted that this use of “infinite dignity” is not some misuse or abuse of language. As noted above, human language is very often context-dependent. Theology in particular is no exception to this. In order to say things that are true, given the limitations of human language, we very often have to speak in a context-dependent way, especially when we wish to say something about a particular question or context.

In closing, I want to note that this does not mean that the document is beyond reproach. First, we have spoken here only about the title and first line. Second, nothing we have said implies that the way the document communicates its meaning is most clear, inspiring, etc.

But, if my interpretation is correct, while it could be said that the document is unclear, it could not be said that it is wrong or heretical. And this is precisely what some have called it.

In order to retain the reading that the document is heretical on this question of dignity, one would have to maintain one of the following two objections to what I have written above:

1. The document is not speaking within the context of human dignity and the way in which it is possessed but is rather talking about dignity simply. This means that the document and its authors do indeed intend to say that man’s dignity is equal to God’s in every way.

2. The language is dependent upon the outlined context, but its claim is still incorrect. Ontological human dignity is not possessed inexhaustibly but can be gained or lost, or at least increased or decreased.

The first objection is, I think, inattentive to the text and/or born out of approaching the text already with a bias of suspicion. The second objection, I would argue, is simply contrary to previous Church teaching and Catholic anthropology.

ADDENDUM: It is worth noting that St. Thomas explicitly says in ST I, q. 7, a. 2: “Things other than God can be relatively infinite (infinitum secundum quid), but not absolutely infinite (non simpliciter).” The example that he gives is wood being finite in its own form but infinite in regard to the number of shapes that it can take on. But this distinction can be applied to many different ways in which a created thing can have properties called infinite. And as I have argued here, the mode by which it possesses its finite form (i.e. immeasurably) is another case of proper application.

1. Herbert McCabe, God and Evil in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (London & New York: Continuum Books, 2010), 55.

2. Dignitas infinita, §7: “Yet, this possibility always exists for human freedom, and history illustrates how individuals—when exercising their freedom against the law of love revealed by the Gospel—can commit inestimably profound acts of evil against others. Those who act this way seem to have lost any trace of humanity and dignity. This is where the present distinction can help us discern between the moral dignity that de facto can be “lost” and the ontological dignity that can never be annulled. And it is precisely because of this latter point that we must work with all our might so that all those who have done evil may repent and convert.”