A lot more could be said here, but it does appear to be the case that the document mentions certain actions that are contrary to human dignity and yet sometimes choiceworthy. After all, one of the things listed as contrary to human dignity is war, but I do not suspect that the document means to cast aside the entire tradition of just war.
One could maintain that war and the death penalty are things of this sort: in one sense contrary to human dignity insofar as they are or pertain to natural evils and yet, since not morally opposed to human dignity, are sometimes (unfortunately) choiceworthy. But this is to say something is contrary to human dignity in a different sense than when one says that sexual abuse, human trafficking, or surrogacy are contrary to human dignity.
Dr. O'Neill, thank you for your article. If your distinction between natural evils and things morally opposed to dignity is correct, what should we make of this line from Par 52 (relating to euthanasia and assisted suicide):
"Indeed, there are no circumstances under which human life would cease from being dignified and could, as a result, be put to an end."
Should this line be read only in relation to the subheading in which it presents itself, or a vision for the document as a whole?
I think Rosmini’s use of the same phrase “infinite dignity” in his Ethics might provide a different way of interpreting it… (especially relevant as he is cited in the document).
Very good article, Dr. O'Neill! What do you make of the statement on the death penalty?
"Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances."
A lot more could be said here, but it does appear to be the case that the document mentions certain actions that are contrary to human dignity and yet sometimes choiceworthy. After all, one of the things listed as contrary to human dignity is war, but I do not suspect that the document means to cast aside the entire tradition of just war.
One could maintain that war and the death penalty are things of this sort: in one sense contrary to human dignity insofar as they are or pertain to natural evils and yet, since not morally opposed to human dignity, are sometimes (unfortunately) choiceworthy. But this is to say something is contrary to human dignity in a different sense than when one says that sexual abuse, human trafficking, or surrogacy are contrary to human dignity.
Dr. O'Neill, thank you for your article. If your distinction between natural evils and things morally opposed to dignity is correct, what should we make of this line from Par 52 (relating to euthanasia and assisted suicide):
"Indeed, there are no circumstances under which human life would cease from being dignified and could, as a result, be put to an end."
Should this line be read only in relation to the subheading in which it presents itself, or a vision for the document as a whole?
I think Rosmini’s use of the same phrase “infinite dignity” in his Ethics might provide a different way of interpreting it… (especially relevant as he is cited in the document).